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COMMENTARY
CORPORATE WELFARE:
IF BUSINESS LOCATION INCENTIVES DO NOT
WORK, WHY DO LOCALITIES CONTINUE TO
OFFER THEM?
Katja Hamel
The state of Minnesota offered Northwest Airlines a financial package
worth nearly $838 million as an incentive to build two new aircraft
maintenance facilities intended to create one thousand five-hundred new
jobs in late 1991. 221 Northwest has since put the project on hold and no
222
new jobs have yet been created . In 1993, Alabama assembled a $300
million incentive package to attract a Mercedes-Benz plant which would
employ one thousand five-hundred workers.2 23 The tax breaks and other
subsidies provided by the state of Alabama amount to $200,000.00 per
job. 24 These are but two high profile examples of a practice frequently
used by localities that has become known as "corporate welfare."
State and local governments provide a variety of inducements to
persuade private industries to locate in their areas. Corporate welfare takes
the form of property and sales tax abatements or exemptions, low interest
loans, grants, utility credits, and other financial incentives given to
companies by states and localities with the expectation that these
companies will bring with them more jobs and increased revenue for the
residents of those communities. Because these programs are largely
promise- based rather than performance based, they often fail to meet
expectations. Despite the overall inefficiencies of business location
incentives, other factors assure their continued use.
221 David Phelps, Northwest Deal Approved, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St.Paul), Dec. 17,
1991, at IA.
222 Phil Bereano & Todd Fedorenko, Hooking High-Tech - For a Price - Corporate
Welfare in Washington - Subsidies, Incentives Don't Always Pay Off, Seattle Times,
Mar. 23, 1997, at B7.
223 E.S. Browning & Helene Cooper, Alabama Won The Business, But Some Wonder If It
Also Gave Away the Farm; Will Image Now Improve?, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1993, at Al.
224 Allen R. Myerson, Alabama Paying Dearly to Have Mercedes Plant, Greensboro
News & Record, Sep. 8,1996, at El.
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Local economic development plans including location incentives are
not only used to attract new industries, but also to keep existing businesses
from relocating. In 1993, New York City revised its tax apportionment
formula for corporations to encourage Dreyfus and other financial
companies to stay in the city.225 Similarly, Illinois taxpayers gave Sears a
land package and cash worth $240 million to help Sears move its
corporate headquarters thirteen miles as an alternative to relocation out of
226
state. Surprisingly, economic development programs are generally not
based on corporate financial need. Incentive programs are often offered to
financially stable corporations and yield almost no benefit to localities.
227
An extreme example occurred in Baton Rouge, Louisiana where the
Exxon Corporation received more than $14 million in tax abatements and
was expected to create only one new permanent job.228
Additionally, such programs are not offered exclusively on the state
and local level. The federal government too has been criticized for using
millions of taxpayer dollars to promote sales of American products
overseas. 9 In 1992, the Federal Agricultural Department gave $465,000
in tax money to subsidize McDonald Corporation's commercials
advertising Chicken McNuggets and $450,000 to the Campbell Soup Co.
to promote the sales of V8 juice overseas.230 The advertisements were part
of a Market Promotion Program funded with $200 million in taxpayers'
money.231
Despite what seem astronomical costs, municipal officials continue to
offer subsidy programs in the hope that they will create employment
opportunities and expand the local tax base, thereby stimulating and
promoting a healthier overall economy. One commentator notes that the
advantages of local economic development programs fall into two general
categories - local autonomy and economic competitiveness.
232
The power to grant location incentives and subsidies designed to
attract corporate investment may be construed as an exercise of local
225 Paul R. Kahan, State Economic Development Initiatives, Tax Executive, Nov. 21,
1996; available in 1996 WL 9885182.
226 Bereano, supranote 2, at B7.
227 See, e.g., Mike Meyers, Government Subsidies for Private Businesses Ought to Be
Stopped, Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St.Paul), Dec. 1, 1995, at 2D.
228 See Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public Wealth, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 101, at
108 (1995).
229 See Catherine S. Manegold, Labor Secretary Urges Cuts for Corporate Welfare Too,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1994, at Al9.
230 Jennifer Dixon, $200 Million From Taxpayers Help Finance Ads, Orange County
Register, Feb. 3, 1992, at Al.
231 See id.
232 Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 Tex. L.
Rev. 669, 691 (1994).
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autonomy and this serves as a powerful justification for such incentives.233
Offering attractive investment incentive packages gives municipalities the
power and the freedom to shape their own destinies. Supporters argue that
economic incentive programs are selective by nature and that this allows
localities to target companies that meet essential criteria including job
creation, construction control, neighborhood improvement, tax income,
and economic diversification.
234
Furthermore, by offering incentives, state governments show their
desire to create a pro-business environment.2 35 Many states and localities
offer incentive programs to project an economically competitive
community image. Others feel they have no choice but to offer incentives
or lose coveted businesses and industries to other locations. 236 There is
substantial competition between states and municipalities to attract
economic opportunities. 237 Proponents of incentive programs contend that
local incentive programs are solid public investments and are vital to the
creation of new jobs.238 But are they?
Many studies have attempted to measure the effectiveness of incentive
packages in promoting economic development and creating job
opportunities for local residents. 239 The consensus is that corporate
location determinations turn on a number of factors, the majority of which
cannot be altered by localities. 240 One commentator has summarized the
primary factors cited by companies regarding site selection decisions to
include "(1) location of suppliers and markets, (2) the costs and quality of
available energy and land, (3) the cost of capital, (4) the availability and
cost of housing for management and employees, and (5) security and other
amenities."241 Additionally, there is evidence that intangible psychological
pressures, described as the "herd instinct" play a role in location
determinations.
242
233 See id.
234 An Attractive Idea Offering Hewitt Associates $500,000 in Incentives to Move to
Orange County is Not Corporate Welfare. It's a Smart Business Move, Orlando Sentinel,
Jan. 3, 1997, at A8 [hereinafter Attractive Idea].
235 Taylor, supra note 12, at 691.
236 Matthew T. Furton, Note, The Use of Penalty Clauses in Location Incentive
Agreements, 70 Ind. L.J. 1009, 1017 (1995).
237 Martin Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 Urb. Law. 198, 198
(1987).
238 Edward P. Lazarus, Note, The Commerce Clause Limitation on the Power to
Condemn a Relocating Business, 96 Yale L.J. 1343, 1361 n.91 (1987); see also Furton,
supra note 16, at 1017.
239 See Furton, supra note 16, at ---; see also Lazarus, supra note 18, at
240 Gold, supra note 17, at 198.
241 See id.
242 See id.
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Researchers generally agree that firms initially satisfy their expansion
needs by expanding existing sites or building satellites nearby.24 When
companies do relocate, research suggests that businesses first select a
geographic region then compare communities based on factors significant
244to the type of venture involved.. Commentators characterize corporate
investment as a long-term profit-oriented decision.245 Areas failing to offer
long-term profitability criteria such as infrastructure quality, fiscal
stability and general business climate will not be able to offer enough
special incentives to attract and retain businesses. 246 However, supporters
contend that incentives "can and do make a difference in tilting a business
toward picking a given community."
247
Setting aside the debatable effectiveness of incentives in enticing
corporations to choose a particular location, how effective are they once a
company gets there? Critics challenge the ultimate effectiveness of local
incentive programs on several grounds.248 Financial incentives are often
attacked as disguised government spending frequently offered with no
analysis or accountability. 249 Tax incentives are often not considered
expenditures and therefore are frequently not budgeted prior to being• • 2 5 0
offered or evaluated to determine their effectiveness.
Critics also charge that the provision of municipal incentives directly
reduces the public resources available for other investments essential to
economic development such as education and infrastructure
improvements. 251 Alabama was driven to spend beyond its means to
attract Mercedes. 252 To keep its $300 million dollar promise to Mercedes,
Alabama raided its education fund, borrowed from its state pension fund,
and called out the National Guard for a "training mission" to clear the land
for the plant site.253 Critics contend that attracting businesses with a
community's solid assets such as a well-developed infrastructure and an
educated, skilled work force is far better than using incentives. 254 Not only
would dollars invested in the local infrastructure be more likely to
243 Jennifer L. Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation on
Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 Urb. Law. 427, 434 (1995).
244 Id.
245 Moss, supra note 8, at 108.
246 Id.
247 Attractive Idea, supra note 14, at A8.
248 See Furton, supra note 16, at 10 16-17.
249 See id. at 1016; see also Richard D. Pomp et al., Can Tax Policy Be Used to Stimulate
Economic Development, 29 Am. U. L. Rev. 207, 218 (1980).
250 Richard D. Pomp et al., Can Tax Policy Be Used to Stimulate Economic Development,
29 Am. U. L. Rev. 207, 218 (1980).
251 Furton, supra note 17, at 1016.
252 Myerson, supra note 4, at El.
253 See id.
254 Larry Hufford, Recruit Only Businesses That Benefit Cities, San Antonio Express-
News, Dec. 4, 1996, at 5B.
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substantively influence a corporation's decision to relocate, but those
investments are guaranteed to serve the community in the long term.
Additionally, authorities argue that incentive programs benefit new
businesses at the expense of existing businesses. 255 "The principal inequity
may be that they place other businesses, which do not qualify for tax
abatement at a competitive disadvantage., 256 For instance, Iowa gave
$738,000 in tax abatements to Iowa Beef Processors, a subsidiary of
Occidental Petroleum Corporation. 257 Critics contend this assistance may
drive many smaller meatpackers out of business. 258 An extension of this
criticism is the claim that assistance to one business amounts to
discrimination or favoritism by the government toward that entity.
259
Others have argued further that incentives are actually detrimental
because they distort free-market competition and misallocate resources.
260
Incentive programs are perceived as an interference with the market in its
natural form which will produce negative consequences which override
any benefits they may yield.261 This view "emphasizes that when
government induces businesses and jobs to move, it does so at the expense
of another location. Thus, government assistance merely moves jobs from
one location to another, with a zero sum game nationally.
'
"
262
Economists argue that competitive markets lead to the most
economically efficient allocation of resources and determine how much of
each good will be produced.263 Critics counter that interference with
naturally competitive efficient markets leads to a misallocation of
resources. 264 If a locality grants a subsidy to a business already enjoying a
competitive advantage over the rest of its industry, the subsidy leads to an
"underallocation of productive resources to that industry."265 The subsidy
may give the business enough market power to restrict output and drive up
its profits by increasing prices. 266 "[S]ociety loses the net benefit of theproduction that would have occurred in the competitive market. "267
255 Furton, supra note 16, at 1016.
256 Andrew L. Kolesar, Note, Can State and Local Tax Incentives and Other
Contributions Stimulate Economic Development, 44 Tax Law. 285, 296 (1990).
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 Gold, supra note 17, at 229.
260 See, e.g., Furton, supra note 16, at nn. 46-49 and accompanying text.
26 Gold, supra note 17, at 229.2 62 See id. at 199.
263 Taylor, supra note 12, at 680-81.264 See id. at 681.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 Taylor, supra note 12, at 680-81.
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If a locality manages to persuade a business to locate in its area, how
likely is it that they will stay? Some companies threaten to relocate to
pressure localities into offering incentive programs.26 8 Businesses that
relocate primarily because of investment incentives are likely to move on
again when they get a better offer.269 In 1991, General Motors Corporation
announced that the company would cease operating at its Willow Run
Plant in Ypsilanti, Michigan and would relocate in Arlington, Texas.
270
Only four years earlier, GM had promised to maintain nearly five
thousand jobs at its Willow Run plant for twelve years after receiving
significant tax abatements.271 Texas offered an incentive package designed
to induce General Motors to close the Michigan plant rather than the one
in Texas.
Furthermore, there is a human cost to location incentives rarely
considered by municipalities. Critics argue that location incentives
encourage corporations to change locations frequently without regard for
the disruption of the lives of their employees that results.272 Others believe
that large corporations which expand into small communities draw the
most talented workers in the area preventing them from developing
entrepreneurial enterprises which may be of greater long term value to the
community.273
However, even as ineffective as such local incentive programs may
appear, municipalities continue to clamor for the attention of corporations
and compete with each other by offering them. The widespread use of
subsidies and local incentive programs and the trend toward escalation of
these programs "illustrates a belief by public administrators that they are
sound public policy. '274 Critics charge that incentive programs exploit
localities' fears that businesses will move elsewhere forcing states into
competition with one another.
In an attempt to counteract this trend, some regions have attempted to
formulate agreements to address the problems that stem from
competitiveness among states. In late 1991, New Jersey, Connecticut,
New York State, and New York City signed a "non-aggression" pact
designed to reduce the competition among them.275 The agreement was
designed to set limits on the subsidies and incentives each was offering to
268 Furton, supra note 16, at 10 16-17.
269 Hufford, supra note 34, at 5B.
270 Charter Township of Tpsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Mich.
1993).
271 See id. at 557-58.
272 Furton, supra note 16, at 1017.
273 Taylor, supra note 12, at 685.
274 Furton, supra note 16, at 1018.
275 Furton, supra note 16, at 1014.
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attract and retain businesses.276 Within the first year of the pact's signing,
all four participants had "essentially disregarded the voluntary agreement
and returned to their earlier practice of raiding each others' businesses."
2 77
In fact, the incentives and subsidies offered after the collapse of the non-
aggression pact were more complex than the ones offered before the
signing of the compact.
278
Furthermore, political forces have become important motivators for
local officials to increase their use of location incentive programs. 279 The
survival instincts of political incumbents combined with campaign
promises of job creation and increased economic development lead
communities to offer incentive packages that are not justified based on
their cost and projected return. 280 "Moreover, elected representatives
perceive financial inducements to be a low cost method of job creation, at
least when compared to public works programs."2 81 It is contended that
another common reason that governors and mayors continue to offer
incentive packages is to simply create the appearance for their constituents
that they are creating jobs.282 "By taking visible steps to encourage
economic growth, they can take credit for subsequent economic successes,
whatever their actual causes ..... ,283 Political pressures make it difficult for
mayors and governors to eliminate the use of incentive programs. Because
they appear to work, the risk is too high that the companies will locate
elsewhere.
284
Local officials faced intense political pressures when Toyota Motor
Manufacturing USA, Inc. ("Toyota") selected Scott County, Kentucky as a
potential site for a new facility. 285 Kentucky had, just months earlier, lost a
bidding war for a Saturn facility to the state of Tennessee. 286 Kentucky's
state pride was at stake and the governor was facing increasing pressure to
bring an industrial 'success' to the state. 287 These factors are cited as
contributing to the size of the incentive package Kentucky offered.288
Similarly, in the midst of the bidding war preceding the eventual deal
between Sears and the State of Illinois, a state official commented, "'We
276 See id.
277 See id.
278 See id.
279 Furton, supra note 16, at 1012.
280 See id.
281 See id.
282 See Furton, supra note 16, at 1012-13.
283 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Restraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 394 (1996).
284 Getting the Job Done, Cap. Dist. Bus. Rev. (Albany, N.Y.), June 24, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 10010654.
285 Furton, supra note 16, at 1012.286 See id. at 1012-13.
287 See id. at 1012-13.288 See id. at 1013.
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think it's important for the city's image to keep an important corporate
citizen."
289
If incentives are successful, or at least are perceived as a successful
means of attracting and retaining business, then states will continue to use
them.290 Location incentive programs, including tax incentives, will
continue to be offered, primarily because "the political rewards are still
tempting. ' 291 State and local officials find themselves trapped in a
prisoners dilemma.292 Competing localities would enjoy the greatest
economic benefit if no incentives were offered.293 However while states
and localities may communicate their desires to one another, they have no
means to enforce an agreement not to grant subsidies.294 "Faced with the
likelihood that some governments will cheat and enact incentives, other
governments will follow suit to ensure they are not placed at a competitive
disadvantage. ,
295
Ultimately, the effects of incentive programs may not be realized,
analyzed or documented, until years later, if at all.296 This gives
governments and local officials all the freedom and incentives they need
to continue to compete for new businesses.297 Although substantial
evidence demonstrates the costliness and inefficiency of business location
incentives, because of their apparent effectiveness and the highly
competitive nature of today's market, their use continues to increase.
289 Lindsey Tanner, Illinois Scrambles to Keel the Sears Address in Chicago, Wash. Post,
Feb. 21, 1989, at Dl.
290 Kolesar, supra note 36, at 297.291 See id. at 307.
292 Taylor, supra note 12, at 693.
293 See id.
294 See id.
295 See id.
296 Kolesar, supra note 36, at 307.
297 See id.
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